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EDITORIAL  
Par Jean-Claude Thébault 
2010 – 2020 : 
Urgences et perspectives 
Au sortir de la crise économique 
et financière mondiale, et dans un 
contexte de mondialisation ac-
crue, les Européens doivent im-
pérativement relever des défis 
urgents mais qui, paradoxale-
ment, s’inscrivent dans des hori-
zons lointains.  
Ainsi, l’Europe doit redéfinir les 
moteurs de la croissance écono-
mique, désamorcer les bombes à 
retardement que sont les dettes 
publiques, renforcer sa gouver-
nance économique, et investir 
dans son capital humain.  
Parallèlement, elle doit aussi af-
fronter la question du réchauffe-
ment climatique, celle du déve-
loppement durable, et la nouvelle 
donne géopolitique – notamment 
en matière d’énergie.  
Enfin, l’Europe doit faire face 
aux défis du vieillissement de sa 
population, de l’immigration et 
de l’intégration de ses minorités 
ethniques. Face à ces défis, la dé-
marcation entre le court terme et 
le long terme ne fait plus guère 
de sens tant les enjeux sont entre-
croisés 
Décalages et partages 
Alors que les États membres sont 
le plus souvent soumis aux aléas 
politiques propres à la nature pro 
tempore des démocraties euro-
péennes – la tyrannie du court 
terme – l’Union européenne, bé-
néficiant du privilège de la conti-
nuité, se doit d’inscrire son action 
dans la durée.  
C’est le rôle et la responsabilité 
de la Commission européenne 
de développer une vision d’en-
semble, une stratégie sur le long 
terme, afin de mieux orienter 
ses choix politiques. Dans cette 
optique, la stratégie Europe 
2020 et le réexamen budgétaire 
illustrent bien ce besoin de défi-
nition des priorités stratégiques 
de l’UE sur le long terme. Mais 
il s’agit aussi de dépasser les lo-
giques encore trop sectorielles 
et de développer des approches 
plus intégrées, afin d’adapter les 
pratiques de la Commission aux 
réalités d’interdépendance du 
XXIe siècle. 
John Maynard Keynes disait: 
“À long terme, nous sommes 
tous morts”. Mais c’est aujourd-
’hui que nous, européens, ris-
quons d’être, sinon morts, du 
moins très affaiblis, si nous n’ap-
prenons pas à conjuguer le futur 
au présent.  
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Nos tâches 
Dans ce contexte le BEPA doit se resituer dans 
une optique de moyen et long termes, afin de 
préserver son rôle crucial de trait d’union entre la 
Commission et les acteurs du changement d’au-
jourd’hui et de demain. Le BEPA bénéficie du 
recul nécessaire pour observer globalement les 
tendances sur des horizons lointains, et préparer 
les premiers éléments de réponse aux défis à ve-
nir. Cette remise en perspective du BEPA est 
vitale, car elle assure la mise en phase des politi-
ques de la Commission avec les exigences futures 
et le besoin d’adaptation constant propre au  
XXIe siècle.  
 
C’est donc sur ce souhait de mise en perspective 
que s’inscrit ce nouveau numéro de BEPA Mon-
thly qui se penche sur des propositions récentes 
de la part de l’Union en matières économiques et 
budgétaires. Il s’agit de nourrir le débat au delà 
des échéances plus immédiates et de se préparer 
aux défis prévisibles des années à venir et aux 
répercussions possibles de nos décisions actuel-
les, de manière à éviter à l’Europe une “décennie 
gâchée”. 
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Crisis, they say, is the mother of change. And 
crises have in the past played the role of catalyst 
for further integration in Europe. It could hap-
pen again now. 
The crisis of the euro during the first half of 
2010 brought to an end a long period of stability 
that had followed the creation of the single cur-
rency. Greece found itself at the centre of the 
crisis because it was seen as having the worst 
combination of three deficits: namely 1) a huge 
budget deficit, coming on top of a very large ac-
cumulated debt; 2) an expanding and unsustaina-
ble deficit in the current account, combined with 
3) a credibility deficit as Greek governments we-
re found to have been – shall we say – economi-
cal with the truth and very flexible in their use of 
statistics.  
Sure, the crisis exposed the results of years of 
economic mismanagement in Greece. But it also 
revealed a) the short-sightedness of financial 
markets which had been financing until very re-
cently those deficits at low interest rates and, 
now, were typically over-reacting to the realisa-
tion that the party could no longer continue, and 
b) the weakness of euro governance structures.  
It was not just about the growth and stability 
pact, imperfect in its design, weakened and poor-
ly implemented in the process. The pact could 
have conceivably prevented the fiscal crisis in 
Greece, if it had worked properly. But it was ne-
ver intended to deal with the financial and cons-
truction bubbles experienced in Ireland and 
Spain. 
A support mechanism was created for Greece in 
May, setting a new record in international finan-
cial history. It was coupled with strong conditio-
nality, and the stabilisation and reform program-
me is being monitored jointly by the European 
Commission, the ECB and the IMF. This was 
soon followed by a much bigger European finan-
cial support facility to be activated if and when 
the need arises – in the hope that it will not.  
Greece is now implementing fiscal consolidation 
measures and structural reforms that would have 
been simply unthinkable only one year ago. The 
risk of bankruptcy surely helps to concentrate 
minds. Yet the programme will be a difficult test 
of endurance for the country’s political system, 
its economy and society at large; nobody knows 
in advance what the threshold of pain is beyond 
which the patient may no longer be able to coo-
perate. Other vulnerable members of the euro 
zone have also embarked on ambitious and pain-
ful fiscal stabilisation measures.  
We are now near the end of a difficult negotia-
tion which is expected to lead to closer and more 
binding coordination of national economic poli-
cies, extending well beyond public budgets to 
macroeconomic imbalances, biting sanctions and 
more effective surveillance, as well as greater em-
phasis on structural reform. A new crisis resolu-
tion mechanism has also been put on the table, 
although this may require another treaty reform 
– which will surely be no easy task, judging from 
recent experience and the mood prevailing in 
several Member States.  
What lies behind 
The final shape of the new governance structure 
for the euro zone is not yet known at the time of 
writing. Combined with new provisions for fi-
nancial regulation and supervision (which have 
eventually gone much further than expected only 
a few months ago), it seems to be going in the 
right direction: closer coordination, stronger ru-
les backed by the threat of sanctions, and close 
monitoring.  
The proposals made by the Commission in late 
September have framed the context and the 
contents of the negotiations, in conjunction with 
the discussions in the Task Force chaired by 
Herman van Rompuy. The final equation is sha-
ping up reasonably well but, of course, the devil 
always lies with implementation – even more so 
when it all relates to the EU with its complex 
decision-making structures.  
1 Governing the euro zone: learning by doing?  
By Loukas Tsoukalis* 
* Loukas Tsoukalis is Professor of European Integration at the University of Athens and President of ELIAMEP.  
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Until now, in fact, the negotiations have 
shown a significant divergence of views and 
perceived interests building, in turn, on an in-
creasing divergence of economic performance 
among member countries – not a rock-solid 
basis to build upon.  
The choice between rules and political discretion 
has always been a difficult one, and rules indeed 
become more important when trust declines. 
This may be the situation in Europe today, re-
grettable though this may be. But macroecono-
mic policy cannot rely only on rules. Closer coor-
dination of national economic policies is indeed 
a good thing, but how will macroeconomic prio-
rities be set for the euro zone as a whole? And 
how will the burden of adjustment between sur-
plus and deficit countries be distributed?  
This is an old problem that dates back to the first 
negotiations on European monetary integration, 
and further back to Keynes and the Bretton 
Woods arrangements. The French most notably 
have tried to ensure some symmetry in the distri-
bution of the burden of adjustment between sur-
plus and deficit countries in the European mone-
tary system from the very beginning – judging 
from results, mostly in vain.  
Distribution issues are always politically awk-
ward, and lurking behind the debate about the 
crisis resolution mechanism has been another 
one, namely the distribution of the costs of a 
hypothetical sovereign default between taxpayers 
and creditors. 
There is no agreement between countries on the 
timing of exit strategies or the appropriate dose 
of fiscal reflation at a time when economic reco-
very remains fragile in most countries (there is 
no agreement among economists either, al-
though this should hardly come as a surprise). 
Financial markets that have rather belatedly reali-
sed the risk associated with rising sovereign debt 
are again setting the tune, and the tune is fiscal 
consolidation all around, and fast. The German 
government, and a few others, sing the same tu-
ne.  
We can only hope that they will be proved right 
this time. If Europe were instead to plunge soon 
into another recession, followed by further in-
creases in unemployment, it could all turn nasty. 
Remember that the social and political conse-
quences of financial crises come with a time lag. 
Matters of interest 
Further integration today is happening through 
necessity, not choice. If anything, there seems to 
be little appetite for it in most European capitals. 
Nothing wrong with it, the realist might reply: it 
is need that brings change, good intentions will 
not do the trick. Perhaps so, but one possible 
consequence could be a more intergovernmental 
kind of integration being born out of the recent 
crisis. Such integration would not necessarily be 
resistant enough when the next crisis hits. 
The stakes are indeed high. In May 2010, Euro-
pean leaders reached the edge of the precipice; 
luckily, their instinct of survival prevailed. This is 
precisely what those betting on the demise of the 
euro had not really understood or anticipated – 
and not for the first time. Hopefully, European 
leaders will continue doing the same as we all try 
to adjust to a post-bubble world.  
Learning by doing, or political balancing on a 
tight rope at a vertiginous height? We live in in-
teresting times, although I understand that for 
the Chinese this is meant to be a curse, not a 
wish.  
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The EU functions through three distinct, but 
linked modes of governance. The traditional core 
approach is regulatory (in the widest sense), 
exemplified by the single market, the euro and 
the range of policies that underpin them. Second, 
there is co-ordination of national policies – 
which has expanded significantly since the 
creation of the euro and the launch of the 
Lisbon strategy. 
The third mode of EU economic governance is 
direct spending which, by contrast, has played a 
fairly marginal role in recent years. Indeed, 
despite the changes introduced in successive 
Multi-annual Financial Frameworks, the budget 
remains concentrated on the same two policy 
areas – agriculture and cohesion – as it was 
twenty years ago. Although some spending from 
the EU budget was included in the European 
Economic Recovery Package, it was not large 
enough to make a meaningful macroeconomic 
difference. Using the EU budget as part of the 
funding package for the European Financial 
Stability Facility agreed in May 2010 was a 
potentially more momentous development, 
although it remains to be seen whether it was a 
one-off or the harbinger of a new approach. 
Despite being subject to a review that was 
supposed to be conducted in 2008/9 (and for 
which the leitmotif was that there should be “no 
taboos”), the budget has also suffered from a 
lack of political attention, mostly because other 
policy priorities always seem to take precedence. 
Initially, it was securing ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, especially after the Irish “No” vote. Then 
it was the exigencies of the financial and 
economic crises. More recently, the “Greek 
crisis” and the risk of contagion spreading to 
other Member States saw the bulk of the political 
effort over the last six months focused on how 
to improve policy coordination at EU level and 
agree on more effective regulatory mechanisms: 
the resulting van Rompuy proposals are now on 
the table. 
At long last 
But so, too, is the oft-postponed Commission 
Communication on the budget review, published 
on the 19th of October. The intention of the 
review was to examine the principles on which 
the budget was to be based, and not to be the 
first round of negotiations about money.  
This was never going to be an easy distinction to 
make, but the Commission Communication does 
indeed focus on what to spend the money on 
rather than how much should be allocated. In 
particular, it suggests that the budget should be 
concentrated on core policy areas, interpreted 
principally as the “Europe 2020” strategy 
captured in the “smart, sustainable and inclusive” 
formula for EU growth. Special emphasis is 
given to the scope for EU level spending to 
support the EU’s capacity for growth. 
The question now is whether the conclusion of 
the review will pave the way for a radical 
modernisation of the budget as the third arm of 
economic governance, contributing more 
emphatically to the ambitious goals the Union 
has set itself for the next decade and to 
forestalling a “lost decade”. 
History does not offer much encouragement, 
and the Communication ultimately gives only 
limited guidance. It makes a compelling case for 
placing innovation at the heart of the budget and 
ensuring that more resources are available for 
new policies, including action to deal with the 
threat of climate change. But it also argues for 
persevering with EU spending on agricultural 
policy and a cohesion policy that offers resources 
to all Member States, paying little heed to the 
merits of a more concentrated cohesion policy. 
Indeed, there is a danger of turning cohesion 
policy into an all-purpose instrument for 
delivering “Europe 2020” that could detract 
from its core role in supporting economic 
development of less-favoured regions. Nor does 
the Communication give a clear sense of whether 
2 The EU budget and the risk of  a “lost decade” 
By Iain Begg  
* Iain Begg is Professorial Research Fellow, European Institute, LSE  
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a pronounced shift in the balance of EU 
spending is justified. It is easy to understand why 
it has taken this line and why it wants to avoid 
discussing money – but it is not necessarily the 
best recipe for decisive reform. 
Budgeting from Mars  
It is tempting to imagine what sort of EU budget 
would emerge if a consultant from Mars were 
given a blank sheet of paper and asked to design 
a suitable package to promote the long-term 
growth and well-being of the EU. The said 
consultant would almost certainly start by asking 
what the most pressing challenges are and, once 
these were identified, which level of government 
would be best-placed to respond to them.  
Some are bound to transcend what can be done 
effectively by regions or even entire Member 
States acting alone – the most obvious of which 
are acting to address climate change and 
developing long-term solutions to energy needs 
that combine sustainability and a substantially 
reduced dependence on politically volatile 
suppliers. 
Achieving a 30% reduction in carbon emissions, 
as is envisaged in “Europe 2020”, will be 
demanding, yet it is broadly accepted that the 
EU will subsequently have to aim for still larger 
abatement of carbon emissions. Mitigating 
carbon emissions must not, however, be seen 
purely as a cost, because there are undoubted 
business opportunities associated with a shift to 
a “greener” paradigm involving extensive use of 
new technologies. In this regard it is important 
to distinguish three categories of technologies: 
Those that are known and proven, but which 
need to be more effectively diffused and 
scaled up in a way that reduces marginal costs 
and thus improves incentives to adopt them; 
Those for which the science is broadly 
understood, but which need to be further 
developed as part of an innovation strategy to 
become commercially and socially viable; 
The “blue-skies” ideas that will provide 
breakthroughs capable of reconciling long-
term energy needs with environmental 
sustainability. 
 
For all three directions for technological 
advance, the rationale for support from the EU 
budget is the classic one that Member States 
acting alone will find it harder to appropriate the 
benefits of investing in them, and will thus be led 
to under-invest. Consequently, a persuasive case 
exists for EU level funding. 
Landing in EUrope 
The trouble in all of this is that the debate on the 
EU budget is trapped in its own past. A good 
example of both the magnitude of the political 
challenge and the poverty of the debate is an 
editorial published in The Times on 25 October 
2010, just days before the European Council 
expected to agree major reforms of European 
economic governance. For The Times, what 
David Cameron ought to use all his guile to 
achieve is not a shift in spending priorities, but 
preservation of the UK rebate. 
One of the hopes expressed in the 
Communication (and one that it is easy to share) 
is that, by switching to some new form of 
authentic “own resource” rather than direct 
contributions from Member States, the 
debilitating obsession with net contributions will 
diminish. Sadly, this could well prove 
disingenuous: however much purists rail against 
the notion of juste retour, every Finance Minister 
at the negotiations will anticipate to two decimal 
places what the net cost or benefit to his or her 
country of any new MFF will be. 
 By then, it will be important to offer an 
alternative and ambitious rationale for EU 
expenditure proper: the Communication is a 
start, but the signposts should be moved more 
decisively. 
Our Martian consultant would be tempted to 
embark on a rocket home if asked to reconcile a) 
the continuing demands for sizeable proportions 
of a budget amounting to barely 1% of EU GDP 
to be spent on agricultural policy and cohesion 
policy in richer regions, with b) the many new 
demands around grand challenges.  
Quite simply it cannot be done, and the clear 
implication is that it is time for hard choices to 
be made. Will the decision-makers in all 
European capitals rise to this challenge?  
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Arrivées  
Le 15 octobre Graeme Carter a rejoint le BEPA 
en tant que membre de l’équipe Outreach – 
Dialogue européen. Auparavant il travaillait au 
parlement européen.  
L’équipe Outreach – Dialogue européen accueille 
également Katharina von Schnurbein, qui 
travaillait précédemment en tant que porte-
parole pour le commissaire Vladimir Špidla, 
chargé de l’emploi, des affaires sociales et de 
l’égalité des chances. 
Enfin, depuis début octobre, et pour les cinq mois 
à venir, deux jeunes diplômées effectuent leur 
stage au BEPA: Marie Bonnenfant et Aylin Lusi. 
Le BEPA souhaite la bienvenue à ses nouveaux 
membres. 
Evénements  
Le 21 octobre, le BEPA a organisé une réunion 
avec une trentaine de représentants de think 
tanks européens de premier plan. Le président 
Barroso les a reçus autour d’un déjeuner pour 
discuter des actualités en Europe et dans le 
monde. Hervé Jouanjean, Directeur-Général de 
la DG Budget; Robert-Jan Smits, Directeur-
Général de la DG Recherche, et Koen Doens, 
chef du service des Porte-paroles, ont nourri le 
débat en présentant les derniers développements 
qui ont eu lieu dans leurs services respectifs. Les 
échanges entre les participants externes et les 
membres des différentes DG étaient enthou-
siastes et constructifs. La réunion renforce et 
reflète le besoin mutuel d’engagement dans un 
dialogue constant entre la Commission d’une 
part, et les acteurs externes d’autre part – dans 
lequel le BEPA joue le rôle crucial de médiateur. 
Le 15 octobre, BEPA a accueilli dix-huit 
représentants d'organisations philosophiques 
non-confessionnelles issus de onze états 
membres. Dans la matinée, une réunion s'est 
déroulée en présence M. Jerzy Buzek, président 
du Parlement européen, et M. Herman van 
Rompuy, président du Conseil européen, ainsi 
que M. Maroš Šefčovič, vice-président de la 
Commiss ion  cha rg é  de s  r e l a t i ons 
interinstitutionnelles et de l'administration. Ils 
ont débattu des moyens de lutter efficacement 
contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale, un 
impératif pour la gouvernance européenne. La 
discussion s’est tenue dans un esprit de franchise 
et d’ouverture. Les invités ont exprimé leur 
soutien à la stratégie Europe 2020 et ont souligné 
leur engagement permanent en faveur d’un 
renforcement de la cohésion sociale et de la 
solidarité – la crise actuelle ne pouvant être 
surmontée qu’en plaçant les individus et la justice 
sociale au cœur des politiques européennes. 
Le 27 octobre le président de la Commission a 
inauguré la Salle Ortoli – anciennement Salle 
Hebdo – au 13e étage du Berlaymont, en 
présence de la famille, les amis et collègues de 
M. Ortoli, tels que le vicomte Etienne Davignon 
ou M. Yves Thibault de Silguy. Francois-Xavier 
Ortoli fut président et vice-président de la 
Commission européenne de 1973 à 1977. 
Evénements à venir 
Le 15 novembre BEPA recevra un colloque sur 
la lutte contre la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale, 
organisé par l’Association Européenne de la 
Pensée Libre (AEPL). Le débat sera animé par 
M. Andor, Commissaire européen pour l’emploi 
et les affaires sociales, Prof. David Piachaud de la 
London School of Economics, ainsi que M. Jean
-Pierre Garson, chef de division “migration 
internationale” à l’OCDE. 
Publication 
Le quatorzième numéro de Ethically Speaking vient 
de sortir. Ce bulletin d’information est composé 
de contributions des Comités Nationaux 
d’éthique de l’Union Européenne, de 
contributions des membres du Groupe Européen 
d’éthique et d’importantes organisations 
internationales. Il traite des problèmes éthiques 
que soulèvent fréquemment les progrès 
fulgurants de la technologie, la biologie et la 
médecine, tels que la bioéthique, la protection des 
données personnelles ainsi que le clonage animal. 
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